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THE NLRB WIELDS ITS RULEMAKING 
AUTHORITY: THE NEW FACE OF 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS 
“Big Labor has found faithful friends on the Obama N.L.R.B., who 
are working hard to fix a process that isn’t broken.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2011, a majority of the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “Board”) proposed radical revisions to its representation 
election procedures. The final rules were published in the Federal 
Register on December 22, 2011 and will take effect on April 30, 
2012—less than one year after they were first proposed. The 
unprecedented controversy that followed the June announcement 
involved a two-day public Board meeting, legislation intended to 
block the undesirable effects of the proposed amendments, and at 
least one federal lawsuit. This latest—and radical—attempt at 
substantive rulemaking has left many observers questioning the 
legitimacy of the Board itself. 
This Comment analyzes the substance of these amendments, their 
practical effect on all parties, and the reasons for their enactment. 
This Comment concludes that the amendments are unprecedented, 
sweeping, and unfair; they put employers at an extreme disadvantage 
in their ability to express their views about unionization, and, as a 
result, deprive employees of their right to make an informed decision. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”),2 focusing on its main provisions; the NLRB, and its 
function as an adjudicative versus rule-making body; and finally, the 
NLRB’s existing representation election procedures. Part II then 
                                                                                                                 
1 See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would Streamline Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2011, at B3 (quoting Representative John Kline commenting on recent amendments to 
NLRB representation election procedures).  
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151–169 (2006). 
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explores the significant decline in union membership and considers 
whether that decline can be attributed to an unfair election process. 
Part III details the substantive changes made to representation 
elections through the Board’s amended election rules, as well as what 
the Board intends to accomplish with these new rules, and analyzes 
whether these new amendments effect a positive or negative change. 
Part III also analyzes the reaction to and controversy surrounding the 
proposed amendments and criticizes the Board’s reasoning and its 
hasty decision-making process. 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NLRA, NLRB, ITS ADJUDICATIVE 
VERSUS RULEMAKING FUNCTION, AND REPRESENTATION ELECTION 
The NLRA is the principal law governing relations between labor 
organizations and private-sector employers engaged in interstate 
commerce.
3
  
A. The NLRA Is Born and Its Constitutionality Is Upheld 
The NLRA was enacted in 1935 with the passage of the Wagner 
Act.
4
 In order to promote commerce and alleviate industrial strife,
5
 
the Act made explicit employees’ rights to organize and bargain 
collectively. Specifically, the Act provided that “[e]mployees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”6 
The NLRA also affirmed employees’ right to strike, curtailed private 
sector labor and management practices that could injure both 
individual employees and the national economy, prescribed the 
process for representation elections, created the NLRB, and provided 
for judicial enforcement and review of Board orders.
7
 
                                                                                                                 
3 GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004). 
4 DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 9 (3d ed. 2011). 
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (stating the purpose and policy of the Act); cf. RAY ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 10 (“Senator Wagner [author of the Act] primarily saw the Act as a weapon 
against the Depression, which he attributed to underconsumption caused by too unequal a 
distribution of wealth. Collective bargaining, he thought, would both restore an element of 
fairness and industrial democracy to the workplace, and redistribute wealth in such a way as to 
reinvigorate the economy.”). 
6 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)). 
7 See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–54, 158, 159, 160, and 163) (describing the principle 
features of the original Act); see also, National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Dec. 29, 
2011) (identifying the congressional motivations for the Act). 
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The Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”8 is the 
constitutional basis for the Act.
9
 Professor William B. Gould IV of 
Stanford Law School
10
 noted that “[t]he constitutional theory upon 
which the [Act] is predicated is that statutory regulation of labor and 
management is necessary to diminish industrial strife that could 
disrupt interstate commerce.”11 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corporation,
12
 upheld the Act. Chief Justice 
Hughes’s majority opinion rejected the idea that labor relations had 
only an indirect effect on interstate commerce: 
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, 
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant 
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their 
industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into 
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect 
interstate commerce from paralyzing consequences of 
industrial war?
13
 
Because the ability of employees to bargain collectively is “an 
essential condition of industrial peace,” the Court held that the 
national government was justified in penalizing employers that 
“[r]efus[ed] to confer and negotiate” with their employees.14  
B. The NLRB 
The NLRA is administered by the NLRB. The Board is principally 
charged with conducting representation elections and investigating 
unfair labor practices.
15
 However, the Board also has the power to 
adjudicate cases when the NLRB Administrative Judge decision is 
appealed.
16
 A panel of three Board members usually decides these 
cases; but the full Board will hear those that are “novel or potentially 
                                                                                                                 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
9 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 28 (4th ed. 2004). 
10 Directory, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/26/ 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
11 GOULD, supra note 9, at 28. 
12 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
13 Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
14 Id. at 42. 
15 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) and (c); 160(a) (2006) (vesting in 
the Board powers related to the conduct of representation elections and the prevention of unfair 
labor practices); see also RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 21–22 (detailing the primary functions of 
the Board). 
16 Decide Cases, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/decide-
cases (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
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precedent changing.”17 Case-by-case adjudication is the primary 
method by which the Board exercises its policy-making authority.
18
  
The Board is typically comprised of five members.
19
 Each member 
is appointed for a five-year term by the President, subject to Senate 
approval, with one member’s term expiring each year.20 But when the 
Board amended its election procedures in 2011, the Republican-
controlled Senate had blocked each of President Obama’s 
nominations and, as a result, the NLRB was composed of only three 
members.
21
 President Obama named Mark G. Pearce, already a Board 
member, Chairman after Wilma B. Liebman relinquished the position 
at the expiration of her term.
22
 Pearce’s term will expire in August 
2013.
23
 Brian Hayes, the only Republican Board member, will lose 
his position in December 2012.
24
 The term of the third Board 
member, Craig Becker, a recess appointment,
25
 expired in January 
2012.
26
 The composition of the Board is an important preface to a 
discussion of the Board’s revisions to its representation election 
procedures because the position taken by each member during the 
comment period bears on this Comment’s analysis that the revisions 
are largely defective. 
                                                                                                                 
17 Id. 
18 See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
19 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 21. 
20 Id; accord 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).  
21 See National Labor Relations Board, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_labor_relations_
board/index.html [hereinafter Times Topics] (discussing a twenty-six month period in which 
Democrats and Republicans blocked each others’ Board nominees). 
22 Mark G. Pearce, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/mark-g-pearce-chairman (last visited Mar. 3, 2011); Times Topics, supra note 21. 
23 Mark G. Pearce, supra note 22. 
24 Brian Hayes, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/brian-hayes (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
25 Recess appointments are temporary Presidential appointments made when the Senate is 
not in session. HENRY B. HOGUE, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 
(2011). The terms of recess appointees are temporary, however, and expire at the end of the next 
session. Id. 
26 Board Members Since 1935, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) 
(indicating that Member Becker served until January 3, 2012). On January 4, 2012, President 
Obama bypassed the Senate advise-and-consent process and extreme Republican opposition by 
making three recess appointments to the Board. Rick Manning, Obama’s Extraconstitutional 
NLRB Appointments, THE HILL (Jan. 5, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
judiciary/202617-obamas-extraconstitutional-nlrb-appointments. He acted while Congress, 
which had been meeting in intermittent sessions to prevent this very result, was away for 
holiday break. Lisa Mascaro, Bypassing Congress, Obama will appoint three to NLRB, L.A. 
TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/04/news/la-pn-obama-nlrb-recess-
appointments-20120104.  
 4/12/2012 10:34:36 AM 
2011] NLRB WIELDS ITS RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 593 
1. The NLRB’s Rulemaking Authority 
The Board undoubtedly possesses substantive rulemaking power. 
This power is rooted in section 156 of the Act: “The Board shall have 
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the 
manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act],
27
 such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this [Act].”28 In American Hospital Association v. NLRB, a 
unanimous Court upheld the Board’s substantive rulemaking 
authority.
29
 In that case, the Board had promulgated a rule to define 
the scope of collective bargaining units in healthcare facilities.
30
 The 
Court held that the Board’s “broad rulemaking” powers31 under 
section 156 were “unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at 
issue.”32 In sustaining the rule, the Court noted the “extensive notice 
and comment rulemaking conducted by the Board, its careful analysis 
of the comments that it received, and its well-reasoned justification 
for the new rule.”33 
The Board also has broad discretion to choose whether to exercise 
its rulemaking authority or rely exclusively on adjudication.
34
 As one 
commentator explained, “[this choice] probably does not reflect a 
straight-forward effort to identify the method that will produce the 
best substantive decision. The agency will be primarily concerned 
with choosing a policy-making method that will allow it to be 
efficient and yet survive judicial review.”35 Nevertheless, courts defer 
to this choice because they understand that agencies, given the 
minefield in which they must operate, are in the best position to 
                                                                                                                 
27 The Administrative Procedures Act prescribes extensive procedural requirements. First, 
general notice of the proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register. Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2011). After the notice is published, the agency must provide 
interested persons a reasonable period of time to comment on the proposed rules. Id. at § 553(c). 
Finally, after consideration of the comments, the agency must finalize the rule and incorporate 
in the rule a concise statement of its basis and purpose. Id. 
28 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). 
29 499 U.S. 606, 606 (1991). 
30 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608 (1991). See Collective-Bargaining Units 
in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (April 21, 1989) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 103) for a full text of the final health care rule.  
31 499 U.S. at 613. 
32 Id. at 610. 
33 Id. at 618; see also Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable 
Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1132–35 (2005) 
(examining the success of the health care collective bargaining unit rule—the last major 
substantive rulemaking issued by the Board). 
34 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (“[T]he Board has 
discretion to decide that the adjudicative procedures in this case may also produce the relevant 
information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues.”). 
35 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 531 (2005). 
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choose the appropriate course of action.
36
 Notably, the NLRB has 
relied almost exclusively on case-by-case adjudication.
37
 In enacting 
comprehensive changes to its representation election rules, the Board 
disregarded this self-imposed tradition. 
2. A Preliminary Analysis: Rulemaking as a Superior Law-Making 
Mechanism 
Many commentators recommend that the Board enact more law 
through formal rulemaking instead of case-by-case adjudication.
38
 In 
particular, rulemaking would produce stability and confidence in 
Board rules, ensure political accountability, and enhance policy 
making. 
The primary benefit of rulemaking is that it would produce 
stability and confidence in Board rules. Adjudication provides little 
guidance to regulated parties or the agency itself. As one 
commentator observed, “[u]nless the adjudicatory decision is 
distorted with dictum on situations not involved in the case being 
decided, both agency and regulated public must resort to reading a 
line of cases and formulating from them a statement of the principles 
or policies followed by the NLRB with respect to a particular 
matter.”39 Rulemaking would enable laypersons and lawyers alike to 
understand and adhere to Board rules.
40
 The process would also give 
those subject to the rules greater confidence that the rules will not 
transform with each new administration.
41
 
                                                                                                                 
36 Id. at 532. 
37 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 
412 (2009) (“[I]n the past 20 years, the Board has issued a smattering of procedural, privacy, 
and housekeeping rules—mostly as final rules—and has used the notice-and-comment process 
only 17 times.”); Rachlinski, supra note 35, at 530 (“Some agencies, notably the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), make policy largely through the adjudication process.”). 
38 See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 37, at 435 (“The NLRB should reconsider its long-
standing antipathy toward rulemaking.”); cf. Tuck, supra note 33, at 1140 (“[B]ecause of 
increasing opposition from Congress, problems resulting from the judicial review process, 
partisan divisions at the NLRB itself, and the lack of well-developed precedents for 
controversial issues, rulemaking at the NLRB is currently not feasible for controversial, 
substantive issues.”). 
39 Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s Performance in 
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 272 (1968). 
40 See id. (“[T]o the extent possible the Board should try to be of service to non-
specialists, whether laymen or lawyers.”). 
41 See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations 
Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 13–14 (2009) (“NLRB policy 
reversals—which come with each new administration as surely as spring follows winter—is 
another area where properly employed rulemaking would enhance the confidence of the parties 
that acting in conformity with preexisting Board law will not result in adverse remedial 
consequences.”); Lucas R. Aubrey, NLRB Decisions and the Role of Precedent, LAB. & EMP. 
LAW, Winter 2010, at 3 (“A switch to resolution of significant policy disputes through formal 
rulemaking might reduce the perceived flip-flopping in board law.”). 
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The rulemaking process would also ensure political accountability. 
It may be unclear, in the course of a particular adjudication, whether 
the Board is making an important policy decision.
42
 Conversely, if it 
were to utilize rulemaking, the Board could not avoid political 
accountability by masquerading important policy decisions as facts 
specific to an individual adjudication.
43
 
The Board’s use of formal rulemaking, therefore, would be a 
welcome departure from its customary reliance on case-by-case 
adjudication. Indeed, some members of the public applauded the 
Board for its most recent use of the process to propose amendments to 
the representation election process. Professor Lofaso, for instance, 
said that “[t]he Board should be commended for acting under its 
statutory rulemaking authority to modernize outdated and confusing 
rules.”44 She also offered that “[t]his is good government acting at its 
best.”45 However, for the reasons set forth in Part III, the Board’s use 
of rulemaking with respect to its representation election procedures 
was defective, or at least inadequate. 
C. Representation Elections 
Employees have the right to unionize or, alternatively, to decertify 
a union when they no longer wish to be represented.
46
 A primary and 
critical function of the NLRB is to conduct secret ballot elections to 
determine whether a majority of employees wish to be represented by 
a particular labor union.
47
 Both unions and employers must adhere to 
intricate procedural requirements throughout the election process.
48
 
Because the NLRA itself provides little guidance as to election 
procedures, unions and employers must look instead to those Rules 
and Regulations that the Board has promulgated.
49
 These 
requirements, as well as the resolution of pre- and post-election issues 
                                                                                                                 
42 Peck, supra note 39, at 272. 
43 Tuck, supra note 33, at 1126. 
44 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., PUBLIC MEETING ON PROPOSED ELECTION RULE 
CHANGES 11 (2011) [hereinafter PUBLIC MEETING] (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso). 
45 Id. at 36. 
46 Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employee-rights (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
47 See RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 60 (“Typically, the method by which employees select 
a union, or choose not to be represented by one, is by a majority vote in a secret ballot election 
in an appropriate bargaining unit.”). 
48 See infra Part I.C.3. 
49 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 60. The Rules and Regulations relevant to representation 
elections are codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60–102.72. The NLRB published its first series of 
Rules and Regulations in the Federal Register on April 18, 1936. See Representation—Case 
Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138, 80,142 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. pts. 101 
and 102) [hereinafter Final Amendments]. 
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concerning the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and conduct of 
the election, are set forth below. 
1. Defining the Bargaining Unit 
Only those units of employees with a “community of interest” are 
appropriate for unionization.
50
 Among the factors that the Board 
considers in determining the appropriateness a particular bargaining 
unit are: (1) “whether the employees are under common supervision”; 
(2) “on what basis the employees have communicated or bargained in 
the past”; (3) “whether the employees have contact with one another 
at the workplace and whether, for instance, they clock in and clock 
out at the same location”; (4) “similarity in the type of work 
performed”; (5) “similarities in wages, hours, and working 
conditions”; and (6) “the desires of the employees.”51 Those 
employees with a supervisory status are excluded from the voting 
unit.
52
  
Unions possess a unique advantage in their ability to define the 
bargaining unit. Richard A. Epstein, professor at the New York 
University School of Law,
53
 explained that “[u]nion support is not 
uniform in workplaces, and this power of unit designation allows the 
union to shrink or expand the unit in order to maximize its chances of 
overall success.”54 Thus, defining the bargaining unit is a critical step 
in the representation election process. 
2. Important Prerequisites to a Representation Election 
Once the bargaining unit is defined, the union must file an election 
petition with the nearest Regional Office,
55
 along with a “showing of 
interest” demonstrating that at least 30 percent of the employees in 
the proposed unit want the union in question to represent them.
56
 The 
                                                                                                                 
50 GOULD, supra note 9, at 40. 
51 Id. 
52 ROBERT LEWIS & WILLIAM A. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: 
MANAGEMENT’S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 156 (2d ed. 1979). Supervisory status 
is important because if a supervisor is included in the bargaining unit, and the union wins the 
election, that supervisor is covered by the contract. Id. at 157. On the other hand, “[w]ith the 
benefit of hindsight, the employer who has lost a close election may regret the day his caution 
influenced him to exclude these employees from the voting unit.” Id. 
53 Faculty Profiles: Richard Epstein, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=26355 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
54 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 42 
(2009). 
55 Frequently Asked Questions—NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).  
56 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 61. The union could turn over as proof of substantial 
support through signed and dated authorization cards or a petition signed by the requisite 
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Regional Director then conducts a preliminary investigation to 
determine whether there is “reasonable cause to believe that a 
question of representation affecting commerce exists.”57  
If the Regional Director determines that the petition is properly 
supported, he or she serves the parties with a hearing notice, which is 
designed to resolve contested questions—such as when and where the 
election will occur, the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, and 
voter eligibility—before the election is conducted.58 The hearing 
officer takes evidence in a non-adversarial hearing and forwards a 
transcript to the Regional Director.
59
 The Regional Director then 
reviews the hearing record and any post-hearing briefs, issues 
findings and conclusions as to the contested issues, and either orders a 
representation election or dismisses the petition.
60
  
The employer, in turn, must provide the Board with an Excelsior 
list within seven days of the election order.
61
 This requirement is 
named after Excelsior Underwear Incorporated. v. NLRB,
62
 in which 
the Board held that an employer is obligated under section 158(a)—
which prohibits an employer from interfering with or coercing 
employees in their right to unionize
63—to supply to the union upon 
request an accurate list of eligible voters’ names and addresses.64 The 
Excelsior list is an important tool for the campaigning union, and, 
accordingly, this requirement is strictly enforced.
65
 Even though 
section 158(a) limits what an employer may say to its employees 
during a campaign, the employer may explain to its employees that it 
was required by the Board to turn over the information contained in 
the Excelsior list.
66
 
                                                                                                                 
 
number of employees. Id. (citations omitted). 
57 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a) (2011). 
58 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 64. The union and employer may, and often do, resolve 
consensually all pre-election issues through a consent election agreement, subject to approval by 
the Regional Director. Id. 
59 Id. at 64–65 (citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 67. 
61 Id. 
62 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
63 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
64 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40. 
65 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 67; see also id. at 85 (“Both anecdotal evidence and 
empirical studies have emphasized the importance of union contact with the bargaining unit 
employees to the chances of union success in an organizing campaign.”). 
66 LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 162. 
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3. The Representation Election 
The Act does prescribe some procedural details regarding the 
representation election process. Either party is entitled to have 
observers present.
67
 The Employer may challenge a voter’s eligibility 
to vote in the election, in which case the voter’s ballot is merely 
separated from the others, and, if the Regional Director rules against 
the challenge, it is tallied along with the others.
68
 Objections relating 
to the conduct of the election must be filed with the Regional Director 
within seven days of the election.
69
 Once these objections are 
investigated and resolved,
70
 the NLRB will certify that the union is, or 
is not, the collective bargaining representative of that particular unit.
71
 
Finally, any party who disagrees with the Regional Director’s pre- or 
post-election decision may request review by the Board within 
fourteen days after the election results are certified.
72
 Such review, 
however, is only allowed under a limited number of circumstances.
73
 
The Act does not specify, on the other hand, how soon after 
petitioning the election must be held. The Dunlop Commission 
observed in 1994 that the “median time from petitioning for an 
election to a vote has been roughly fifty days for the last two decades 
(down considerably from the time taken in the 1940s and 1950s).”74 
But the time lapse is even smaller today. In 2008, for instance, 
elections were held in a median of thirty-eight days.
75
 Nevertheless, 
the length of the process remained a primary complaint for labor 
                                                                                                                 
67 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2011) (“Any party may be 
represented by observers of its own selection.”). 
68 RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 67–68. The eligibility of a particular employee to vote may 
be challenged in that he is a supervisor, his job classification falls outside the bargaining unit, or 
he was previously discharged. See LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 224 (discussing 
reasons why a potential voter may be challenged); see also 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2010) (“Any 
party and Board agents may challenge, for good cause, the eligibility of any person to 
participate in the election. The ballots of such challenged persons shall be impounded.”). 
69 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2010). 
70 The Regional Director will order a rerun election if he or she finds that a valid objection 
has been raised. RAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 68; see also GOULD, supra note 9, at 46 (“The 
regional director will investigate but need not hold a hearing to determine the validity of the 
objections unless a party challenging the election shows through specific evidence relating to 
specific individuals material issues of fact sufficient to support a prima facie showing of 
objectionable conduct.”). The original winner wins most rerun elections. LEWIS & KRUPMAN, 
supra note 52, at 238. 
71 Conduct Elections, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-
do/conduct-elections (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
72 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (2010). 
73 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (2010), for the circumstances under which the Board will 
grant review. 
74 Estreicher, supra note 41, at 5 (citation omitted). 
75 Id.; Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3. 
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organizations and substantially motivated the recent amendments.
76
 
Samuel Estreicher, Professor at the New York University School of 
Law,
77
 explained why the time lapse could be cause for concern for 
the following reason: “This [time lapse] is considered problematic 
because employee interest in collective representation can wane and 
dissipate simply by the passage of time. The gap in time before the 
election takes place also enables employers to reduce support for the 
union by running anti-union campaigns . . . .”78 
4. How Employers and Unions Present Their Views 
Employees solicited by the union have heard only one side of the 
story and, consequently, it is important that the employer also be 
permitted to communicate with the proposed unit.
79
 “[T]he Board 
itself,” observed one commentator, “has stressed that the opportunity 
for both sides, both the employer as well as the union, to reach all the 
employees is basic to a fair and informed election.”80 Another 
commentator explained that employees should hear all the downsides 
of the unionization effort—“about union dues, fees, and assessments . 
. . . [about] the union’s political posture or social agenda.”81 Section 
8(c) of the Act expressly protects an employer’s right to oppose 
unionization in that “[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or 
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, 
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an 
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such 
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit.”82 Thus, provided an employer does not threaten or coerce its 
employees or promise a benefit, it may conduct an aggressive anti-
unionization campaign. 
Nonetheless, unions retain a significant advantage in the 
presentation of their views. As one commentator noted, “a union will 
be fully prepared to campaign before an election occurs, as the union 
controls when a representation election will happen.”83 Professor 
                                                                                                                 
76 See infra text accompanying note 78. 
77 Faculty Profiles: Samuel Estreicher, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=19902 (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
78 Estreicher, supra note 41, at 4–5. 
79 See LEWIS & KRUPMAN, supra note 52, at 70 (“An employer is entitled to oppose 
unionization, and may mount a legitimate campaign against it.”). 
80 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 11 (statement of Arnold E. Perl). 
81 Id. at 55 (statement of Peter Kirsanow); see also id. at 74 (statement of Michael 
Prendergast) (“[I]f [employees] don’t get those facts from the employers, they won’t get them 
anywhere else.”). 
82 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). 
83 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 344 (statement of William Messenger). 
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Epstein further observed that “unions are not bound by the same 
restrictions that govern employer speech and thus are free to make 
promises, and often make threats against recalcitrant workers that are 
difficult to prove or counteract.”84 Only unions are permitted to visit 
employees at their home.
85
 Neither the Act nor the Rules and 
Regulations, moreover, limit the number of visits or the number of 
union representatives in any particular visit.
86
 Consequently, many 
employees are left with “an unrebutted story, a one-sided story, not 
necessarily an accurate one.”87 
II. A COLOSSAL DECLINE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The number of American workers in unions has declined 
significantly in recent decades.
88
 According to a 2004 Congressional 
Research Report, “[t]he number of union members peaked in 1979 at 
an estimated 21.0 million.”89 As a percentage, on the other hand, 
union membership peaked in the mid-1950’s at approximately 35 
percent of American workers.
90
 In 2010, that number slipped to a 
seventy-year low of 11.9 percent.
91
 One commentator characterized 
this decline as “exceptional in comparison to other labor 
movements.”92 Indeed, the decline of the American labor movement 
began much earlier and has been much more severe as compared to 
other western nations, “leading to substantially lower levels of 
collective bargaining coverage than elsewhere.”93 
What caused this colossal decline in union membership? The 
change may be explained, in part, by recent large-scale layoffs—
particularly in the construction, manufacturing, education, and local 
government sectors.
94
 One commentator offered this additional 
justification: “[I]n an increasingly globalized, very fast-moving 
world, unionized companies may not be able to adjust as quickly.”95 
                                                                                                                 
84 EPSTEIN, supra note 54, at 43. 
85 See id. at 42 (“Multiple home visits are permitted to unions but not management.”). 
86 See id. at 42–43 (explaining that multiple home visits are permitted and nothing limits 
the number of union representatives in any visit). 
87 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 55 (statement of Peter Kirsanow). 
88 MAYER, supra note 3, at 10. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 12. 
91 Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html. 
92 John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 82, 82 (2009). 
93 Id. 
94 Greenhouse, supra note 91. 
95 Id. (quoting Barry T. Hirsch). A unionized workforce is more expensive for an 
employer to maintain, see MAYER, supra note 3, at 6 (“[M]ost studies find that, after controlling 
for individual, job, and labor market characteristics, the wages of union workers are in the range 
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Moreover, “immutable economic forces,” “shifts in labor force 
composition,” and the failure of unions to adjust to “economic 
realities” may have caused the decline.96 Finally, because they are 
protected by a host of federal laws aimed at a wide variety of 
workplace conduct, employees may not feel the need for union 
protection.
97
 
Employers may also be partly responsible. “[They] have become 
more sensitive to employee concerns, resulting in greater job 
satisfaction among nonunion workers and reducing the demand for 
unionization.”98 Many employers, moreover, have become more 
“aggressive”99 and “sophisticated”100 in their resistance to 
unionization. 
Finally, there is the argument made by many labor organizations—
that the enormous decline can be attributed to an unfair election 
process. As Richard Trumka, president of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) stated, 
“‘[o]ur current system has become a broken, bureaucratic maze that 
stalls and stymies workers’ choices.’”101 Kimberly Brown, Executive 
Director of American Rights at Work, expressed a similar opinion: 
“When employees want to vote, they should have a fair chance to do 
so. As the countless workers who have seen their hopes for a better 
life deferred again and again know all too well, justice delayed is 
truly justice denied.”102 Professor Epstein, however, has voiced an 
alternative view: “[I]t is clear that the decline in unionization cannot 
be attributed to any of the rules governing campaigns, which have 
been stable in form for well over forty years.”103 In any event, by 
                                                                                                                 
 
of 10 [percent] to 30 [percent] higher than the wages of nonunion workers.”), and reduces its 
rate of profit. Id. at 10. 
96 See Godard, supra note 91, at 83, 100 (citations omitted) (discussing explanations for 
the American labor movement’s decline). 
97 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006); 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006); Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e–17 (2006). 
98 MAYER, supra note 3, at 17. 
99 See Greenhouse, supra note 91 (quoting Mr. Hirsch as saying “companies have grown 
more . . . aggressive about resisting organizing drives”). 
100 See MAYER, supra note 3, at 17 (“[M]anagement may have become more sophisticated 
in opposing attempts by workers to unionize.”). 
101 Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3 (quoting Mr. Trumka). 
102 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 300–01 (statement of Kimberly Freeman Brown). 
103 EPSTEIN, supra note 54, at 43. Professor Epstein also argued that “any effort to attribute 
the decline in the American market to distinctive factors of our own system of labor law sorely 
misses the point. Larger, global trends are very much in evidence, which undercut the key union 
claim that distinctive American bargaining procedures drive the current decline in union 
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proposing sweeping amendments to existing election procedures in 
June 2011,
104
 the Board revealed its own major objections to the 
process. 
III. THE NLRB PROPOSES FAR-REACHING AMENDMENTS TO ITS 
REPRESENTATION ELECTION RULES 
On June 21, 2011, the Board proposed extensive reforms to the 
procedures that it employs during representation elections.
105
 
According to the Board, “[t]he proposed amendments [were] designed 
to fix flaws in the Board’s current procedures that buil[t] in 
unnecessary delays, allow[ed] wasteful litigation, and fail[ed] to take 
advantage of modern communication technologies.”106 Anne Marie 
Lofaso, Professor of Law at West Virginia University,
107
 praised the 
proposals in that, “while modest, [they would] go a long way toward 
fixing the well-known problems associated with the current election 
rules.”108 Below is a brief synopsis of the proposed amendments. 
A. Substance of the New Amendments and What the NLRB Hopes to 
Accomplish 
First, and perhaps most significantly, the proposals would 
streamline election procedures.
109
 Under the current rules, parties may 
seek Board review of pre-election rulings “even though such requests 
are rarely filed, even more rarely granted, and almost never result in a 
stay of the election.”110 As a result, most union elections are held 
several weeks after the filing of an election petition.
111
 The revised 
                                                                                                                 
 
membership.” Id. at 13. See id. at 10–20, for a more detailed analysis of the union membership 
decline. 
104 See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812 (June 22, 2011) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101, 102, and 103) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. 
105 Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact Sheet, NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/print/525 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) 
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]. These proposals took up thirty-six pages in the Federal Register. See 
Proposed Amendments, supra note 104. 
106 Fact Sheet, supra note 105; see also Greenhouse, supra note 1, at B3 (explaining that 
the Board seeks with these amendments to “tighten the [election] process by ensuring the 
employers, employees and unions receive needed information sooner and by delaying litigation 
over many voter-eligibility issues until after [the election]”). 
107 Anne Marie Lofaso, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://law.wvu.edu/faculty/full_time_faculty/anne_m_lofaso (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
108 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 36 (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso). 
109 Fact Sheet, supra note 105. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (“Elections routinely are delayed 25-30 days . . . .”); Estreicher, supra note 41, at 5 
(observing that, in 2008, elections were held in a median of 28 days after the union filed an 
election petition). 
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rules, by eliminating pre-election requests for review, aim to 
eliminate this “unnecessary” delay.112 The Board did not expressly 
dictate a timeline for the conduct of an election. But Member Hayes 
indicated in his dissent that the expedited process would result in 
elections taking place between ten and twenty-one days after the 
filing of a petition.
113
 
The proposals second seek to facilitate compliance assistance. 
Current election procedures mandate that both a copy of the election 
petition and notice of any pre-election hearing be served upon each 
party.
114
 Under the revised procedures, these documents would be 
accompanied by a description of NLRB representation election 
procedures and a Statement of Position Form.
115
 This requirement is 
intended to help parties understand the process and identify the issues 
they may want to raise at the pre-election hearing.
116
 
Third, the proposals would make Board pre- and post-election 
hearing dates “explicit and uniform.”117 These dates are currently 
unpredictable and vary by region.
118
 Absent special circumstances, 
the proposed amendments would have pre-election hearings begin 
seven days after a hearing notice is served on the parties.
119
 Post-
election hearings, moreover, would begin fourteen days after the 
ballots are tallied.
120
 
Fourth, the proposals seek to ensure that pre-election hearings are 
limited to resolving genuine disputes.
121
 There are presently no 
mechanisms in place to narrow the issues addressed during pre-
election hearings.
122
 Although section 11217 of the Casehandling 
Manual provides that “[p]rior to the presentation of evidence or 
witnesses, parties to the hearing should succinctly state on the record 
their positions as to the issues to be heard,” such practice is voluntary 
and, consequently, is not uniformly followed.
123
 The proposed rules 
                                                                                                                 
112 Fact Sheet, supra note 105. 
113 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,831. 
114 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a) (2011). 
115 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 
102.63(a)(1)). The Board identified the purpose of a Statement of Position form as follows: 
“[The] form would solicit the parties’ position on the Board’s jurisdiction to process the 
petition; the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit; any proposed exclusions from the 
petitioned-for unit; the existence of any bar to the election; the type, dates, times, and location of 
the election; and any other issues that a party intends to raise at hearing.” Id. at 36,821. 
116 Fact Sheet, supra note 105. 
117 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,821. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(a)(1)). 
120 Id. at 36,844 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(b)). 
121 Id. at 36,822. 
122 Fact Sheet, supra note 105. 
123 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,814. 
 4/12/2012 10:34:36 AM 
604 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
would require parties to state their positions on all issues to be 
litigated no later than the start of the hearing and before any evidence 
is presented.
124
 A hearing officer would determine whether a genuine 
issue exists, as opposed to the Regional Director, who would have 
discretion regarding the presentation of witnesses or introduction of 
relevant evidence.
125
 Finally, parties would lose their ability to later 
litigate any issues other than the ones raised in a Statement of 
Position or in response thereto.
126
 
Fifth, the proposals intend to reduce unnecessary litigation.
127
 
Under current practices, pre-election hearings are often devoted to 
voter-eligibility issues that “may not affect the outcome of the 
election and thus ultimately may not need to be resolved.”128 Under 
the proposed amendments, however, those eligibility issues involving 
less than 20 percent of the bargaining unit would be deferred until 
after the election.
129
 The Board justified this proposal in that: 
[D]eferring both the litigation and resolution of eligibility and 
inclusion questions affecting no more than 20 percent of 
eligible voters represents a reasonable balance of the public’s 
and parties’ interest in prompt resolution of questions 
concerning representation and employees’ interest in 
knowing precisely who will be in the unit should they choose 
to be represented.
130
 
Sixth, the proposals would consolidate requests for review of all 
Regional Director’s decisions.131 Under current election rules, parties 
                                                                                                                 
124 See id. at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a)(1) (“[A]fter the employer 
completes its Statement of Position and prior to the introduction of further evidence, the 
petitioner shall respond to each issue raised in the Statement. The hearing officer shall not 
receive evidence relevant to any issue concerning which parties have not taken adverse positions 
. . . .”); Fact Sheet, supra note 105 (“The parties would be required to state their positions no 
later than the start of the hearing . . . .”). 
125 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 
102.66(a)) (“Any party shall have the right to appear at any hearing . . . and the hearing officer 
shall have power to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into the record 
documentary and other evidence relevant to any genuine dispute as to a material fact.”). 
126 The proposed rules provide for two exceptions to this general mandate. Parties are not 
precluded from contesting or presenting evidence related to the Board’s statutory jurisdiction to 
process the election petition. Id. at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(c)). Nor are 
they precluded from later litigating voter-eligibility issues. Id. 
127 Fact Sheet, supra note 105. 
128 Id. 
129 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,841 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 
102.66(d)) (“If at any time during the [pre-election] hearing, the hearing officer determines that 
the only issues remaining in dispute concern the eligibility or inclusion of individuals who 
would constitute less than 20 percent of the unit if they were found to be eligible to vote, the 
hearing officer shall close the hearing.”). 
130 Id. at 36,824. 
131 Id. at 36,817. 
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must request Board review of pre-election rulings before the election 
and, if they fail to do so, they then waive that right.
132
 The revised 
rules would allow parties to seek review of those and post-election 
rulings—which have always been addressed separately—through a 
“single, post-election request.”133 Special permission to appeal to the 
Board will be granted only in those “extraordinary circumstances 
where it appears that the issue will otherwise evade review.”134 These 
revisions would, moreover, make Board review of both pre- and post-
election decisions discretionary—leaving final decisions about many 
disputed issues to the Regional Director.
135
 
Lastly, the proposals are intended to facilitate communication 
between the union and employees in the proposed unit. The Board 
contends that “employers are, with increasing frequency, using e-mail 
to communicate with employees about the vote.”136 Accordingly, the 
revised election procedures would require the employer provide the 
union not only a final list of employee names and addresses, as is 
currently mandated, but also the personal telephone numbers and e-
mail addresses of those employees, if available.
137
 
B. A Controversial Announcement: Reactions to the New Amendments 
Rulemaking may very well be the superior law-making 
mechanism, as described in Part I. This section, however, argues that 
the Board’s use of the formal rulemaking process in this instance fails 
because it did not permit ample reflection and the amendments 
themselves provide insufficient time for employers to communicate 
their views on unionization, require the disclosure of personal 
employee information, and unfairly benefit unions. 
The public outcry that followed the June 22 publication of the 
proposed amendments, however, raised serious questions as to the 
Board’s reasoning and decision-making process.138 The proposed 
                                                                                                                 
132 See NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (2011) (“Failure to request 
review shall preclude such parties from relitigating [sic] . . . any issue which was, or could have 
been, raised [at the hearing].”). 
133 Fact Sheet, supra note 105; see also Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36, 
842–45 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67 and 102.69) (eliminating parties’ right to file pre-
election request for review of Regional Director decision). 
134 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,840 (to be codified as 29 § C.F.R. 
102.65(c)). 
135 See id. at 36,837, 36,844–45 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(b) and 102.69(d)) 
(setting forth the process under which a party may request Board review of a Regional Director 
ruling). 
136 Id. at 36,820. 
137 Id. at 36,838 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(d)). 
138 This is in sharp contrast to the careful and prolonged consideration given to collective 
bargaining units in healthcare facilities. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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amendments were quickly dubbed by opponents as the “quickie,” 
“ambush,”139 and “microwave election”140 rule. In a memorandum to 
House Republicans, moreover, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor 
included the proposal in a list of the ten most harmful regulations 
proposed by the Obama administration.
141
 Other commentators 
accused the Board of acting pursuant to a politically motivated 
agenda. Phil Kerpen, author of Democracy Denied, commented that 
“what the NLRB is doing is not the action of one rogue agency or a 
few envelope-pushing employees so much as it is a deliberate strategy 
to use the federal government’s regulatory powers to achieve what 
Obama and his political supporters want without having to bother 
with going to Congress first.”142 In all, the Board received more than 
65,000 public comments relating to the proposals.
143
  
The Board invited comments on its proposed amendments through 
a contentious public hearing held on July 18 and 19.
144
 More than 
sixty speakers from the business, labor, academic, and advocacy 
communities participated in the hearing.
145
 Overall, the proposals 
“[were] backed by labor but heavily criticized by business groups.”146 
Employer representatives found no justification for changing current 
election procedure. Maurice Baskin, speaking on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                 
139 AGC Urges NLRB to Withdraw “Quickie Election” Rule, AGC OF AMERICA (Aug. 23, 
2011), http://news.agc.org/2011/08/23/agc-urges-nlrb-to-withdraw-%E2%80%9Cquickie-
election%E2%80%9D-rule/. 
140 John Hayward, NLRB Backs Off On Microwave Union Elections, HUMAN EVENTS 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=47843. 
141 Kevin Bogardus, House Republicans Paint Target on NLRB’s Proposed Union Election 
Rules, THE HILL (Sept. 5, 2011), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/179509-house-gop-
paints-target-on-proposed-union-election-rules. 
142 Peter Roff, Out of Control NLRB Strikes Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 
29, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2011/11/29/out-of-control-nlrb-
strikes-again; see also Peck, supra note 39, at 259 (arguing that, although the Board must 
inevitably make some politically-inspired policy-making decisions, such decisions “should be 
kept at the minimum necessary for effective discharge of the Board’s functions”); Carl 
Horowitz, House Overrides NLRB’s Ambush-Election, Micro-Union Positions, NATIONAL 
LEGAL AND POLICY CENTER (Dec. 8, 2011), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/12/08/house-overrides-
nlrbs-ambush-election-micro-union-positions (“Unable to get Congress to enact his labor 
initiatives, [President Obama] has made appointments to the NLRB and the Labor Department 
who are committed to producing the equivalent of such legislative outcomes as much as 
possible.”). 
143 NLRB Issues Final Rule on Union Elections; Business Groups Respond With Lawsuit, 
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.bna.com/nlrb-issues-
final-n12884906645/. The AFL-CIO alone submitted more than 21,000 comments in support of 
the proposed amendments. Bogardus, supra note 141. 
144 See PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44 for a full transcript of the proceeding. 
145 Details Released on July 18-19 Open Meeting About Proposed Election Rule 
Amendments, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (July 8, 2011), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news/details-released-july-18-19-open-meeting-about-proposed-election-
rule-amendments. 
146 Bogardus, supra note 141. 
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Associated Builders and Contractors Inc., questioned whether the 
Board had been given “a full appreciation of the sense of outrage in 
the business community.”147 He also commented that, “in the midst of 
this terrible economy, the NLRB [should not be] proposing new and 
burdensome regulations that appear to have no purpose other than to 
promote union organizing.”148 The following sections discuss the 
most prominent objections. 
1. Inadequate Thought and Consideration 
As a threshold issue, many employer representatives criticized the 
Board for its failure to proceed with the caution mandated by formal 
rulemaking. Representing the Society for Human Resource 
Management, Roger King commented that “[there is] simply not a 
record for the proposed rules,” and asked the Board to “reconsider the 
speed with which [it is] proceeding and give much more thought and 
consideration to what [it is] doing.”149 Another speaker, noting that 
the rules would impact approximately one hundred million 
employees, suggested that the Board “take a little bit more than two 
days to hear what everybody has to say face-to-face.”150 
Others questioned the authority of a two-person majority to issue 
such comprehensive amendments. Mr. Baskin explained to the Board 
that “[there is] outrage over the haste with which you are moving 
ahead with these sweeping and radical proposals, . . . particularly 
without a full board of confirmed members.”151 Other speakers 
offered that “it is untimely for a Board majority, which will soon be 
composed of only two members, one whom sits by recess 
appointment, to propose and consider any rule, especially such a far-
reaching rule that substantially and fundamentally changes the 
provisions of the Act.”152 
It should be noted that two Board members alone lack legal 
authority to issue new regulations and rulings.
153
 Recall that the recess 
                                                                                                                 
147 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 271 (statement of Maurice Baskin). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 236, 240 (statement of Roger King). 
150 Id. at 88 (statement of Oliver Bell). 
151 Id. at 271 (statement of Maurice Baskin). 
152 Id. at 286 (statement of Harold Weinrich). Member Hayes would later articulate this 
same position: “[I]t would ‘contravene long-standing’ board rules for a two-person majority to 
adopt such a sweeping decision.” Steven Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at B1. Existing procedures could not, in his opinion, “simply be cast 
aside in pursuit of a singular policy agenda without doing irreparable harm to the board’s 
legitimacy.” Id. 
153 See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2645 (2010) (“If Congress wishes to 
allow the Board to decide cases with only two members, it can easily do so. But until it does, 
Congress’ decision to require that the Board’s full power be delegated to no fewer than three 
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appointment of Member Becker was set to expire in January 2012. 
Thus, the Democratic majority was motivated to act expeditiously, as 
least in part, out of concern that it would soon lose its authority to 
vote on the proposed amendments.
154
 The hastiness with which these 
amendments were issued does little to engender confidence in Board 
rules. 
2. Unreasonable Time Frame 
Employer representatives also criticized the shortening of the pre-
election time period in that it would provide insufficient time for 
employers to communicate with employees regarding the pros and 
cons of unionization.
155
 This argument was first articulated by 
Member Hayes in his dissent: “[T]he majority has announced its 
intent to provide a more expeditious preelection [sic] process and a 
more limited postelection [sic] process that tilts heavily against 
employers’ rights to engage in legitimate free speech.”156 One speaker 
similarly contended that, “[u]nless an employer has an adequate 
opportunity to fully utilize its free speech rights between the time a 
petition is filed and an election is held, employees’ rights are 
destroyed, and the employer’s free speech rights become 
meaningless.”157 Another, detailing the right employees have to 
receive information opposing unionization, noted that “[t]here is an 
inseparable bond between a fair election and the right to be 
informed.”158 As for employers, on the other hand, the revised rules 
                                                                                                                 
 
members, and to provide for a Board quorum of three, must be given practical effect rather than 
swept aside in the face of admittedly difficult circumstances.”). 
154 See Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1 (”With Senate Republicans vowing to block any 
replacement nominees, the board will have only two of the five members it is supposed to have 
— not enough to issue any decisions or rules.”). 
155 Chairman Pearce contended, however, that the revisions would affect only 10 percent of 
elections: “The vast majority of NLRB-supervised elections, about 90 percent, are held by 
agreement of the parties . . . in an average of 38 days from the filing of a petition.” Tim 
Devaney, GOP seeks to head off NLRB rules, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at A10. “[T]he 
amendments would apply to the minority of elections which are held up by needless litigation 
and disputes which need to be resolved prior to an election . . . . In these contested elections, 
employees have to wait an average of 101 days to cast a ballot.” Id. 
156 Proposed Amendments, supra note 104, at 36,833. Hayes further cautioned that the 
shorter election process will “stifle full debate on matters that demand it, in furtherance of a 
belief that employers should have little or no involvement in the resolution of questions 
concerning representation.” Id. at 36,829. 
157 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 285 (statement of Harold Weinrich). 
158 Id. at 392 (statement of Jay Krupin); see also GOULD, supra note 9, at 47 (“It is hoped 
that the choice [of whether or not to unionize] will be an informed one.”). The Supreme Court 
has held that employees have an implicit right to receive information opposing unionization. 
Chamber v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (2008) (concluding that Section 157 of the Act, 
which references the right of employees to refuse to join unions, “implies an underlying right to 
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“unduly and severely cut into the time that [they] have to 
communicate with employees during an election campaign, when 
their right to do that is at its greatest and most important.”159 
Some speakers argued, moreover, that a shortened election process 
would harm many small employers. As Tom Coleman, speaking for 
the Printing Industries of America, indicated, “[t]hey don’t have 
access to good sound advice and counsel as how to live within the 
rules, and they don’t have the opportunity to get guidance on how 
they can communicate with their employees.”160 Robert Garbini, 
President of the National Ready Mix Concrete Association, further 
explained that, where legal counsel specializing in union campaigns is 
not readily accessible, the truncated time frame will “lead to a greater 
number of pre- and post-election complaints and possibly unfair labor 
practices due to objectionable actions on part of the employers who 
are unfamiliar with the intricate and confusing laws and rules 
governing union elections.”161 
Union representatives countered that an expedited election process 
would reduce the opportunity for employers to game the system and 
use procedural delay to intimidate employees. One speaker argued 
that “management is not concerned about workers’ rights, but, 
[instead], they’re more concerned with keeping 100 percent control of 
their business to do whatever they want whenever they want at all 
cost.”162 In response to these accusations, Stephen Jones, Director of 
Human Resources for Chandler Concrete Company, suggested that 
the Board punish those particular employers with increased sanctions. 
“Deal with the bad apples,” he argued, “[d]on’t replace or go in and 
replant the orchard.”163 
The shortened election process will surely hinder employers in 
their ability to communicate their views about unionization and, 
consequently, deprive employees of their right to make an informed 
decision. Allowing unions an unfair advantage in the representation 
                                                                                                                 
 
receive information opposing unionization”). 
159 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 422 (statement of David Kadela). “Why the need to 
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160 PUBLIC MEETING, supra note 44, at 307–08 (statement of Francis T. “Tom” Coleman). 
161 Id. at 160 (statement of Robert Garbini). 
162 Id. at 337–38 (statement of Lexer Quamie); see also id. at 38 (statement of Anne Marie 
Lofaso) (“The amendments eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic delay, thereby diminishing 
opportunities for unscrupulous parties to take advantage of systemic delay.”). 
163 Id. at 316–17 (statement of Stephen Jones). 
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election process could undermine election results and, as a result, the 
legitimacy of the union itself.  
3. Invasion of Privacy 
Employer representatives also objected to the expanded Excelsior 
list requirements, namely the disclosure of personal telephone 
numbers and e-mail addresses, in that they contemplate a serious 
invasion of personal privacy. William Messenger, speaking for the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, predicted that 
“[most employees] would likely be appalled to learn that a 
government agency is contemplating handing out their personal 
information to a third-party special interest group without their 
consent, or even potentially over their objection.”164 He went on to 
suggest that “employees’ personal privacy outweighs any kind of 
attempt to balance the electoral campaign between unions and 
employers.”165 Another speaker criticized the proposed requirement in 
that it “go[es] far beyond disclosing one’s home address where [the 
employee] can simply shut the door, go back to dinner, and be done 
with it.”166 Instead, forcing the employee to delete hundreds of text 
messages and e-mails will disrupt the workplace and intrude on his 
right to privacy.
167
 Mr. Baskin offered, moreover, that the two-day 
period for producing Excelsior material is impossible, particularly 
with respect to laid off employees whose information may not be 
readily available to the employer.
168
 
Employees have a legitimate right to privacy. The union’s interest 
in contacting the bargaining unit does not overshadow that right. At 
the very least, employees should have a choice as to whether or not to 
provide their personal contact information and expose themselves to 
potential harassment. 
4. The Creation of an Unequal Playing Field 
Lastly, many comments touched on whether the proposed 
revisions would allow unions an unfair advantage in that they have 
unlimited time prior to the election petition to communicate their 
views, whereas employers would only have the brief time between 
receiving notice of the petition and the election itself. Peter Kirsanow, 
counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers, observed that:  
                                                                                                                 
164 Id. at 344 (statement of William Messenger). 
165 Id. at 349. 
166 Id. at 108 (statement of Ron Holland). 
167 Id. at 108–09. 
168 Id. at 274 (statement of Maurice Baskin). 
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It takes many, if not most, employers, even the larger ones, 
up to two weeks to figure out what it is that they even want to 
say about the particular issue, and thereafter, they’ll have 
three to four [] weeks to communicate that message to 
employees, in contrast to the [thirty] to [forty] weeks the 
union may have already used to communicate its message.
169
  
As one speaker theorized, “[i]f unions were required to notify the 
employer at the outset of their campaign, that would be one thing, but 
often the first the employer . . . learn[s] of the campaign is upon 
receipt of the petition.”170 Employers are already disadvantaged in 
their ability to conduct anti-union campaigns and, under the proposed 
amendments, would be disadvantaged even further. Representation 
elections facilitate the employee’s choice as to whether or not to 
unionize. Employees will find little protection, however, in a flawed 
election process. 
C. A Congressional Blockade 
The contentious debate exhibited during the public hearing quickly 
reached the halls of Congress. House Republicans rallied behind 
legislation intended to block the proposed union election rules.
171
 
Representative John Kline, chairman of the House Education and the 
Workforce Committee, was particularly vigilant in the battle against 
Big Labor.
172
 He proposed a bill that would pre-empt any attempt at 
an expedited election by requiring at least fourteen days before a pre-
election hearing could be held, allowing employers time to find legal 
counsel, and a minimum of thirty-five days before balloting.
173
 His 
bill would also bar unions from requiring employers to provide 
employee telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.
174
  
The House Education and the Workforce Committee voted in 
November to approve the bill.
175
 It passed in the House by a 235–188 
vote.
176
 According to numerous commentators, however, the bill is 
not likely to fair well in the Democratic-controlled Senate.
177
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171 Bogardus, supra note 141. 
172 Kevin Diaz, Rep. Kline Opens New Front on Labor Fight, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 2011, 
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173 The Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act, H.R. 3094, 112th Cong. §§ 2(2)(A) and 
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175 Greenhouse, supra note 152, at B1. 
176 157 CONG. REC. H7985–7986 (Nov. 30, 2011). 
177 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
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D. Member Hayes Threatens to Resign 
On November 18, 2011, the Board announced that it would hold a 
public session later that month to vote on the proposed union election 
rules. In response, Member Hayes threatened not to attend the 
session, which would deprive the Board of the quorum needed to vote 
on the rules.
178
 Hayes alleged that Members Pearce and Becker had 
been less than candid regarding the final revisions they planned to 
make and had not adequately shared with him the public comments 
they received.
179
 Peter Schaumber, former Board chairman, supported 
this choice: “[Hayes] can’t be forced under these circumstances to 
participate in a judicial charade.”180 
But this public threat was not universally commended. Chairman 
Pearce criticized Hayes for making “false or misleading allegations” 
and publicizing an internal matter.
181
 Representative George Miller, 
senior Democrat of the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee, also denounced the decision in that “[Hayes] voluntarily 
chose not to participate in the shaping of the rules and the 
deliberations, and now he’s complaining about it.”182  
Hayes kept observers guessing as to whether he would attend the 
session.
183
 He ultimately decided, however, to participate in the vote. 
“It is not my nature to be obstructionist,” he explained.184 “I believe 
resignation would cause the very same harm and collateral damage to 
the reputation of this agency.”185 
E. An Imperfect Resolution: The Final Amendments 
The Board, in an attempted compromise, ultimately voted to adopt 
a watered-down version of the proposed amendments.
186
 The 2–1 vote 
was as expected: Members Pearce and Becker supporting the proposal 
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and Member Hayes voting no.
187
 In a press release that same day, 
Representative Kline made his continued opposition to the 
amendments clear: “Ignoring the will of Congress and objections 
raised by countless organizations representing workers and 
employers, the NLRB has chosen to deliver a final ambush election 
rule to its Big Labor allies.”188 The six amendments formally adopted 
by the Board provide as follows: 
1. Hearing officers at pre-election hearings are given the 
authority to limit the proceeding to issues relevant to whether 
an election is appropriate.
189
 
2. Post-hearing briefs may be filed “only upon special 
permission of the hearing officer,” when the case presents 
issues that would benefit from such briefing.
190
 The hearing 
officer is given further discretion over the subjects to be 
addressed and the time for filing.
191
 
3. Appeals concerning both pre- and post-election issues are 
consolidated into a “single post-election procedure” and, thus, 
“avoid[] altogether appeals of issues that become moot as a 
result of the election.”192  
4. The recommendation that the Regional Director should 
delay the scheduling of elections at least twenty-five days to 
permit time for a pre-election appeal is discontinued.
193
 
Section 101.21 currently reads as follows: “[U]nless a waiver 
is filed, the Director will normally not schedule an election 
                                                                                                                 
187 Id. The final amendments were published in the Federal Register on December 22, 
2011. See Final Amendments, supra note 49. They will take effect on April 30, 2012. Id. 
188 Press Release, John Kline (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=273371; see also 
Melanie Trottman, Board Scales Back Union-Vote Plan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2011, at A8 
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189 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a)) 
(“Any party shall have the right to appear at any hearing . . . , to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce into the record documentary and other evidence so long as 
such examination, cross-examination, and other evidence supports its contentions and is relevant 
to the existence of a question of representation or a bar to an election.”). 
190 Id. at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(d)); Explanation of Resolution, 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/print/3093 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2011). 
191 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,185 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(d)). 
192 Explanation of resolution, supra note 190; see also Final Amendments, supra note 49, 
at 80,185–88 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67 and 102.69 (eliminating parties’ right to file 
pre-election request for review of Regional Director decision). 
193 Final Amendments, supra note 49, at 80,181 (“Remove and reserve subpart C, 
consisting of §§ 101.17 through 101.21.”). 
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until a date between the 25th and 30th day after the date of 
the decision, to permit the Board to rule on any request for 
review which may be filed.”194 
5. The circumstances under which a request for special 
permission to appeal to the Board will be granted are made 
explicit.
195
 In particular, “[t]he Board will not grant a request 
for special permission to appeal except in extraordinary 
circumstances where it appears that the issue will otherwise 
evade review.”196  
6. The appeal procedure is simplified in that Board review of 
any appeals relating to the election process is discretionary.
197
 
Some proposals, however, are noticeably absent from the final 
amendments. Employers need not provide employee telephone 
numbers and e-mail addresses.
198
 Those provisions requiring the pre-
election hearing be set for seven days after service of the hearing 
notice and a Statement of Position form be filed at the start of the 
hearing have also been removed. But the limited nature of the 
resolution does not mean that these proposals have been rejected. 
They will instead remain under continued consideration by the 
Board.
199
 
The United States Chamber of Commerce filed the first federal 
lawsuit to block the amendments from taking effect. The lawsuit 
alleged that the revisions violate Board procedures and impermissibly 
restrict the free speech rights of employers to make the case against 
unions.
200
 “It is tragic that the Board would expend its resources in 
this manner,” opined Randy Johnson, the Chamber’s senior vice 
president for Labor, Immigration, and Employee Benefits, “creating 
more confusion and uncertainty under our nation’s labor laws, aiding 
only unions and perhaps lawyers, rather than focusing on some type 
of initiative that would encourage job growth.”201 It is unlikely, given 
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the immense criticism the Board has received thus far, that this 
lawsuit will be the last. 
CONCLUSION 
The NLRB could have chosen, consistent with its 75-year history, 
to amend its representation election procedures through case-by-case 
adjudication. Instead, the Board chose to issue substantive rules. 
Rulemaking is an onerous process—it requires preliminary 
publication in the Federal Register, careful consideration of countless 
public comments, and a well-reasoned justification for the new 
rule.
202
 But these procedural safeguards have the potential to garner 
stability and confidence in Board rules, ensure political 
accountability, and enhance policy making.
203
 Unfortunately, the 
Board has achieved none of these goals here. Even the watered-down 
version of these amendments are unprecedented, sweeping, and 
unfair. They put employers at an extreme disadvantage in their ability 
to express their views about unionization and, as a result, deprive 
employees of their right to make an informed decision.
204
 To retain 
any shroud of legitimacy with the American people, the Board, 
particularly in light of its current composition,
205
 must show more 
restraint and bipartisan diplomacy in the upcoming year. 
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